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the arrested act or attitude in its function as superinducing still other act-inducing attitudes. There is no limit to this function of the intermediary; or rather, the only limits are those of nature herself. Is it any wonder the psychologist found consciousness at once indubitable, immutable, indiscerptible, and indefinable! He couldn't define it because he was seeking to state it apart from the very processes which alone could give it any content or meaning.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Moral Values and the Idea of God. W. R. SORLEY. The Gifford Lectures delivered in The University of Aberdeen in 1914-1915. Cambridge University Press. New York: Putnam's. Pp. 534.

Professor Sorley himself summarizes for his reader in a series of propositions the critical steps in the development of his thesis that God is revealed in nature through the medium of value. The summary, even more briefly stated, is as follows:

1. There is a distinction between knowledge of the individual and of the universal. For example, the ideal of science is to terminate in universal formulæ, whereas history is concerned with the individual. The heart of the first proposition is that ultimate reality may be regarded as an individual. "Indeed," he says, "it may be said that nothing else has complete individuality" (p. 506).

2. In seeking complete understanding of any individual it is not sufficient to say that it must be analyzed and synthesized; we must in addition grasp the thing as a unity. This faculty of viewing an individual as a whole he calls synopsis, a Platonic term borrowed from the recent work of Dr. Merz. Thus science through analysis and synthesis may study the properties and the relationships of an individual, while there still remains that other aspect according to which we ascribe a certain worth to it. The two aspects are distinguished as the aspect of causes, and the aspect of value, the former tending to direct interest to the universal, the latter to the individual, since value resides in concrete existences exclusively.

3. The laws of value are unique. Value may be lacking to a thing but not so causal connections and other properties, and moreover intrinsic as distinct from instrumental values belong to persons only.

4. The intrinsic values have the same status of objective validity as have instrumental values or causal connections. For, as the author says: "The grounds for denying the objectivity of morality

are equally grounds for denying the objectivity of knowledge" (p. 508).

5. Since man recognizes moral attainments in terms of value, only because they conform with an ideal standard of value, that ideal moral order must be regarded "in some sense" as having objective reality.

6. If these five points have been established, it remains only to take the synoptic view of reality whereby we find that through the harmonious union of the aspects of cause and of value, and without destroying the world as science knows it, we do yet see in it the revelation of the personality of the "Supreme Value," or God.

7. The problem of evil, or the apparent lack of congruity between the natural order and the moral order, offers the main difficulty for any synoptic appreciation of the universe.

8. Other philosophical theories have failed to meet this problem.

9. Its solution lies in the recognition of two conditions: (a) Morality depends upon freedom, and hence persons realize moral values only imperfectly, since evil must be possible as well as good. (b) There must be purpose in the world as well as freedom in man, and that purpose is evidently that nature may serve as "a fit medium for the fashioning and training of moral beings" (p. 513).

10. This recognition of moral purpose solves the problem of evil and establishes God, the "Supreme Mind," as the ground of all reality.

The distinctiveness of Professor Sorley's contribution to the discussion of the relation of God to the world lies in the uniqueness of his approach to the problem. He seeks to prove the existence of God through the recognition of the objectivity of value instead of following the more traditional path of making value depend upon the existence of God. The clearness, fulness, and consistency with which the argument is developed leave nothing to be desired, and yet a reader, trained as the present reviewer has been in a different school of philosophical thought, puts down the volume feeling that Professor Sorley's conclusion is not inevitable because the logic by which it is reached is shot through with assumptions which are not empirically tested.

There is, for instance, room for divergence of opinion in regard to so important a point as Professor Sorley's discussion of the meaning of individuality as applied to things, to selves, and to the universe viewed synoptically. We may grant that individuality does not belong to a material thing of its own right, but is conferred upon it by persons, the individuality depending upon the purpose with which the person approaches it, or its distinctness from a fainter

context, and that there is no inner principle of unity in a thing, and yet demur when he says that herein lies the difference between a self and a thing. For Professor Sorley speaks of the nature of the self as constituted of something more than describable relationships and properties. The self has a "center" which is "perpetually gathering in new experience which expands the circumference" (p. 221). Also in his consciousness of his own identity he says that each man finds that "his individuality is rooted in the common center of reference in all his states of mind: they are experienced and recognized as his—as one in spite of their differences" (p. 221).

This is to admit that analysis alone can never fully describe the self. "In this respect, therefore, the immediate consciousness or intuition of self has more claim to be regarded as a whole than all the elements taken together which analysis has discovered in it. And there is something else of far greater moment which the analysis must always fail to give" (p. 263).

This spiritual bond, which the analyst can not detect, must be known by what Professor Bergson would call intuition, and what Professor Sorley calls knowing by wholes or synoptically. Although this synoptic view is quite independent of analysis in attaining its conclusion, yet it is not without checks, for Professor Sorley says: "It must show that its interpretation is accurate by submitting to empirical tests—by its ability to give a coherent account of those facts which it is the business of the analytic understanding to exhibit in detail" (p. 270). One wonders, can this be done? Can one be both intuitionist and empiricist? Certainly in regard to the self Professor Sorley's synoptic view has not thrown more light upon its nature by saying that it has "a center," "an inner unity," "a sense of life," "a spiritual bond." This is equivalent to the common sense intuition of a soul or mind which has qualities or states of consciousness, but which itself escapes analysis, and it is far from being "a coherent account of those facts which it is the business of the analytic understanding to exhibit in detail." It does not explain. It stops explanation. It leaves Professor Sorley the difficult legacy of an ego, or willing and knowing center, which, in a way not clearly indicated, enlarges its circumference (*cf.* p. 221) by annexing things and relationships which fall within the scope of analysis.

Nor yet is the synoptic account of the universe more satisfactory than that of the self when tested by the standard Professor Sorley himself submits. We are able, so his argument runs, to recognize in the world of nature a moral order as well as a natural order. This moral order is not subjective; it is objectively realized in the conscious strivings of mankind (*cf.* pp. 508–509), but although realized

thus, it is at best an imperfect realization, which however "enables us to attain a certain insight into the purpose of the whole" (p. 465). Here once more intuition outleaps analysis and gives us the mind of God as the agency of the eternal realization of the values which the world sees incompletely realized in human lives. "The moral order expresses the divine nature; and things partake of this nature in so far as they conform to that order or manifest goodness" (p. 466). This also: "God must therefore be conceived as the final home of values, the Supreme Worth—as possessing the fullness of knowledge and beauty and goodness, and whatever else is of value for its own sake" (p. 474). "In all goodness we must see the manifestation of the divine purpose, in all evil a temporary failure in its realization" (p. 473).

This view finds most complete expression in the chapter entitled "Theism," from which I quote: "If we do not interpret the world as purposive, our view of it can not find room for both the natural order and the moral order. If we do interpret it as purposive we must attribute an idea and purpose of good to the ground of the world" (p. 454).

It is his passion for what he believes is true philosophy which prepossesses Professor Sorley in favor of this conclusion. He repeatedly states that the business of true philosophy is to achieve what I shall call the grand view (*cf.* pp. 509–510). This persistent search for totality and for perfection is evidence that philosophy is still, for some, more of an art than a science, and the intuition which it glorifies under the name of philosophical insight is, as a scientist would protest, a dangerous substitute for the philosophical method which William James has described as "an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly."

Yet Professor Sorley is not alone in his attitude, for a host of distinguished thinkers, as well as many in the rank and file of mankind, would agree with him as to the value of this synoptic insight and the conclusion to which it brings him, that the moral order is an eternal order which serves as a limit toward which personal life tends in its temporal course (*cf.* p. 241). That this ideal standard is a part of reality existing independently of human failure and denial, comforts and inspires him, as it has comforted generations of men. But the radical empiricist finds no comfort in it, for, when he tries to understand it, he does not find that it submits to empirical tests or offers a coherent account of the manner in which it affects his and his neighbor's living. He finds, moreover, as one of our American philosophers has said, that ideals are continuous with natural events and that they but represent the possibilities for conduct of the concrete situation which he faces.

According to the empiricist's view, the problem of reconciling the natural and the moral orders is as artificial as the problem of evil. Both of these problems have their source in certain theistic assumptions, and so persistent are they that unless one assails these assumptions, as the empiricist does, not all the eloquence of apologetics can leave them anything but problems. Professor Sorley feels that he has solved the problem of evil, but it is a question whether by ascribing instrumental value to evil he has not denied rather than explained its existence.

Just as the empiricist finds that moral values grow out of concrete situations of conduct, so he finds that the standard of morality, far from being eternal, is a social product, created in the course of living by the relatively constant physical needs of the human animals who have painfully achieved morality. He sees whole nations struggle almost to the death to preserve ideals of right and justice, even as he sees individual men devote themselves to this same cause. What possible difference can it make to them in their struggle whether the good they strive to accomplish here and now is already eternally existent in the mind of God? It is difficult to see how that knowledge could avail them as much as the knowledge that it is a potentiality of the natural order. Professor Sorley himself demonstrates that goodness, or indeed any value, has as much objectivity as any other quality and one wonders why, if the continuity of the moral order with the natural order is thus established, it is necessary to go further to find a ground wherein the unity of the two may be located. One is tempted to apply to this concept of a ground of union both the method and the result of Berkeley's examination of substance.

Indeed this metaphysical difficulty is even more profound than the ethical. I quote these sentences as illustrative of what I mean: "On this view the world as a whole will be regarded as animated by a universal conscious purpose, which is expressed not only in its arrangements and laws but also in the finite purposes, conscious and unconscious, displayed by individual living beings. This view, however, is not put forward as a doctrine which can be rigidly demonstrated. It is part of that more comprehensive synopsis according to which we have been trying to understand the world as instrumental towards the realization of values" (p. 427).

Here we are asked to recognize in the world as a whole something as inscrutable as the soul which so long halted psychology. The universal conscious purpose is used to mediate between the natural and the moral orders precisely as the soul has been supposed to mediate between the body and conscious states. The difficulties to which this

leads are obvious, the contribution it makes to our understanding of the world is obscure.

Yet, although one may differ with Professor Sorley on many points, one can not but be so impressed by the spirit of reasonable openmindedness pervading his lectures that one wishes he might offer the points of difference as questions for discussion before a study fire, rather than record them as one more instance of the disagreement between the idealistic tradition and that newer philosophy which received its initial inspiration from the later work of William James.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. February, 1919. *Note sulla filosofia di Cicerone* (pp. 5-22): EMILIO CHIOCCETTI. — Cicero is the founder and the most genuine representative of Roman philosophy. He is not a deep philosopher, and he often fails to grasp the systems he opposes; but, even in his shortcomings, he fairly represents the Roman spirit. *La Provvidenza* (pp. 23-43): MARIO STURZO. — Divine Providence primarily consists not in an external action of God upon creatures, but in an intrinsic virtue, which is attached to the particular beings, and leads them to their ends. *Il concetto del tempo nei suoi rapporti coi problemi del divenire e dell'essere nella filosofia greca sino a Platone* (pp. 44-68): ADOLFO LEVI. — A study of the conception of Time in ancient Greek poets and mystics. *Note e discussioni. Analisi d'opere.* G. ZUCCANTE, *Correnti di letteratura pessimistica al nascere di Schopenhauer*: P. C. F. BORGONCINI-DUCA, *Il profilo di S. Agostino e la genesi della dottrina agostiniana intorno al peccato originale*: V. BIANCHI-CAGLIESI. G. B. BIASCHI, *La concezione filosofica dello Stato moderno*: A. GEMELLI. Luigi Ventura, *La concezione nazionale dell'educazione secondo Fovillee*: F. OLGIAI. G. CELI, *Nuovi elementi di filosofia ad uso specialmente dei licei*: F. MARZORATI. *Notiziario*.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. January, 1919. *The Psychology of the Affections in Plato and Aristotle. II. Aristotle* (pp. 1-26): H. N. GARDNER. — Treats of Aristotle's account of pleasure as given in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and of the emotions as given in the second book of the *Rhetoric*. Throughout Aristotle's aim is practical, either to relate pleasure to the moral end, or to relate the emotions to the art of persuasion. The method is empirical. A detailed analysis of Aristotle's views of pleasure and of the emotions is given. *The Place of Pleasure in Ethical Theory*